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CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF 
PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds* 
INTRODUCTION 
The reach of the presidential pardon power has been much in the news of 
late (for a variety of reasons).1 It is well established that the pardon power is 
plenary;2 that it can be exercised in advance of formal criminal charges being 
filed;3 and that it does not extend to state crimes;4 but there remain many unset-
tled (and unsettling) questions. Can a president pardon himself?5 Can a pardon, 
though perfectly lawful in itself, constitute obstruction of justice? Can a presi-
dent use a pardon, issued in advance of criminal activity, to insulate an actor 
from criminal liability before the criminal act is even complete? These are in-
teresting questions, but I intend to address a related, but broader, question: To 
what extent may Congress, via legislation, regulate the president’s pardon pow-
er? Though it is well established that the power is plenary, does that insulate 
the pardon power from any Congressional regulation or oversight at all? And if 
the answer to this question is “no” (and it likely is), then what sort of Congres-
sional regulations and oversight are permissible? I will address these issues in 
this short Essay and offer some suggestions for how Congress might lawfully 
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1  See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Does Trump Have Total Power to Pardon? He Just Might, HILL 
(July 24, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/343408-
opinion-does-trump-have-complete-power-to-pardon-he [https://perma.cc/99ZJ-W9N9]. 
2  Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) (discussing the extensive, plenary nature of the pres-
idential pardon power). See generally Presidential Pardon Power: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107 Cong. (2001) (discussing 
scope and nature of the presidential pardon power). See generally JEFFREY CROUCH, THE 
PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 9–27 (2009) (discussing extent of presidential pardon power). 
3  Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.  at 380 (“[The presidential pardon power] extends to every of-
fence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before 
legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.”). 
4  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Executive Clemency, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
(Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/frequently-asked-questions-concerning-
executive-clemency [https://perma.cc/C9NV-ZDNM]. 
5  See generally, e.g., Andrew Rudalevige, Here’s What You Need to Know About the Presi-
dential Power to Pardon, WASH. POST (July 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/24/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-presidential-po 
wer-to-pardon/?utm_term=.0bd65edf1a2f [https://perma.cc/U59H-63SY]; Turley, supra note 
1. 
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regulate, or at least regularize, the pardon power. 
I.     CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REGULATE 
 It is straightforward that Congress has at least some ability to regulate the 
pardon power. For instance, the pardon power clause itself has a built-in excep-
tion: “[The president] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”6 Ad-
ditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s general “investigative 
power” derived from its legislative powers.7 Arguably bolstering these Con-
gressional powers to place at least some limitations on the presidential pardon 
power is Article 1, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution, which provides,  
The Congress shall have Power To . . . make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Pow-
ers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.8 
The most common discussion of the “necessary and proper” clause has to do 
with Congress’s use of this power to extend, or build upon, other enumerated 
powers, as in the famous landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland.9 But the 
clause expressly applies to “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  
This sweeping language seems rather plainly to encompass any power 
vested anywhere by the Constitution. Since the president’s power to issue par-
dons is itself a power vested by the Constitution in an “Officer”—the presi-
dent—it would be difficult to argue that the pardon power does not fall at least 
                                                        
6  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). One scholar discussed this exception as 
follows: 
The one time when Congress may have an absolute right to obtain testimony and documents re-
lated to presidential pardons is in the context of an impeachment investigation. Once the im-
peachment process has begun, Congress has plenary authority to obtain whatever information it 
needs to complete its investigation, and it therefore seems to be generally recognized that execu-
tive privilege will not shield even the President from producing documents relating to an im-
peachment inquiry. This should apply in the context of a pardon inquiry that is a legitimate part 
of an impeachment investigation and permit Congress to obtain documents and testimony relat-
ing to presidential pardons. 
Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority 
in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225, 1268 (2003) 
(footnotes omitted). 
7  See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (“The power of the Congress to conduct 
investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses in-
quiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed 
statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the 
purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments 
of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. . . . [However n]o 
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the 
Congress.”). See generally Peterson, supra note 6, at 1262–68 (2003) (discussing the scope 
of Congress’s investigative power in the context of pardons). 
8  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). 
9  17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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partially within the necessary and proper clause’s sweep. That being the case, if 
Congress has the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the president’s pardon power (by, for instance, creating the Justice 
Department and a Pardon Attorney Office therein), then Congress should have 
the power to make all laws necessary and proper for limiting the ability of those 
offices and officers to abuse their congressionally-created powers. Congress 
could argue that, even if it has no authority to limit the president himself from 
physically signing a pardon, Congress might be able to limit other Officers 
(e.g., the Pardon Attorney) and, even more generally, the entire executive appa-
ratus supporting the president’s pardon power authority (i.e., the Justice De-
partment).10 Any contrary reading would do violence to the clause, and would 
likely produce substantial collateral damage with regard to other exercises of 
congressional power under this provision. 
II.     WHAT KIND OF REGULATION IS PERMITTED? 
If Congress has the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carry-
ing into execution the president’s pardon power, what sort of laws could Con-
gress enact that might limit, or at least impose certain informational require-
ments on, the exercise of the pardon power? Congress may have the power to 
legislate here, but in doing so it is nonetheless limited by the nature of the par-
don power: It is a plenary power, exercisable at the sole discretion of the presi-
dent. The history of the pardon provision makes clear that the Framers consid-
ered and rejected proposals to subject its exercise to direct control by Congress, 
such as by requiring legislative approval.11 So any legislation that would have 
the effect of tying the president’s hands, or allowing Congress to interfere with 
the president’s power to grant pardons—for example, by limiting the presi-
dent’s discretion in terms of choosing the circumstances, beneficiaries, scope, 
or conditions of pardons—would excessively (and therefore unconstitutionally) 
                                                        
10  See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1255 (“[T]he type of regulation proposed in the [Pardon 
Attorney Reform and Integrity Act, S. 2042, 106th Cong. (2000), H.R. 3626, 106th Cong. 
(2000)] ought to be within the legislative power of Congress. Although . . . Congress could 
not deprive the President of the pen and paper with which to sign a pardon—there is no con-
stitutional requirement that Congress appropriate funds for an executive branch department 
to provide the President with advice on pardon matters.”). 
11  This debate is discussed in THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton):  
The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has, if I mistake not, been 
only contested in relation to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have de-
pended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the legislative body. I shall not deny 
that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of 
that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the society, 
when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring 
the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature. And this 
ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate 
ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong objections to such a plan.  
The Federalist Papers: Federalist No. 74, CONGRESS.GOV: RESOURCES, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistP
apers-74 [https://perma.cc/3X5S-L8VW] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). See generally CROUCH, 
supra note 2, at 16–17 (describing Framers’ debates). 
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interfere with the president’s exercise of that broad plenary power.12 
What does that leave then? Quite a lot, actually. Although Congress cannot 
tie the president’s hands, it seems likely that it could take substantial steps to 
ensure that, under certain circumstances, those hands perform their actions in 
the open—and if not open to the entire public, then at least behind closed doors 
to Congress. Rules providing for such transparency would very likely withstand 
constitutional scrutiny given that a pardon is, by its nature, a public act. What 
sort of rules might those be? Rules intended to ensure notice, understanding, 
and accountability to Congress and/or the public, such as requirements for: 
1. Archiving. An archiving requirement would ensure that presidential par-
dons are recorded and preserved by the National Archives and Records Admin-
istration. For instance, Congress might require that, within 72 hours of execut-
ing a pardon, a copy be deposited with the Archivist of the United States, and 
be made publicly available via the National Archives. Congress could condition 
funding for certain executive branch offices on the administration’s compli-
ance.13 (Congress might even provide—though this is much more of a stretch—
that pardons issued without such notice might be ineffective, or reversible by 
the next president). 
2. Explanation. Congress might further require that pardons be accompa-
nied by a short and clear explanation of the reason for the pardon. Requiring 
such a statement would not limit what the president does, but rather would re-
quire that he or she account to the public (or at least to Congress) for an action 
that, after all, is by its very nature (and by design) a departure from the ordinary 
administration of justice. Where the pardon is for a crime against individual 
victims (as opposed to offenses against public institutions), Congress might re-
quire that a copy of this explanation be delivered directly to those victims. 
3. Accounting. The Archivist might maintain an index of pardons by crimes 
and circumstances, so that each new pardon might easily be compared to prior 
pardons and their treatment of similar crimes and circumstances in the past. 
Over time, this would make it easier to determine when a particular use of the 
pardon power is unusual or inconsistent. 
None of these rules (or, in the same vein, other types of informational re-
quirements that Congress might devise) would directly limit the ability of pres-
idents to pardon individuals or groups. Such rules would, however, provide a 
substantial degree of additional scrutiny and accountability. The archiving re-
quirement in particular would prevent unscrupulous presidents from issuing 
pardons in advance of illegal acts—whether such a president would be pardon-
ing himself, his family, or others—and withholding those pardons from public 
scrutiny (perhaps by keeping them in the family safe or in a desk drawer) until 
they are ultimately needed.14  
                                                        
12  See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (establishing that Congress cannot undo 
pardons or legislatively circumscribe their objects). 
13  See supra note 10.  
14  There is dicta in Ex parte Garland and Ex parte Grossman to the effect that pardons can-
not be issued in advance of a crime, but such statements are, at present, only dicta. Ex parte 
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Informational requirements would constrain a number of such abuses, 
ranging from a president secretly issuing himself or herself a blanket pardon at 
the end (or beginning!) of a term of office, to a president’s use of advance se-
cret pardons as a form of “carte blanche,” get-out-of-jail-free card allowing fa-
vored retainers to violate the law at the president’s direction without fear of 
subsequent prosecution or consequence (even by a successor administration). A 
president could still issue such nefarious pardons, but they would no longer be 
secret—which, in terms of public and political backlash, would substantially 
limit their (nefarious) utility. The relevant retainers might be less convinced 
that such pardons would be honored, and more concerned about extralegal po-
litical consequences, since such pardons would be strong evidence of skulldug-
gery even if they prevented prosecution.15 
Indeed, all regulations of this kind would serve to limit the president’s ple-
nary power to pardon anyone he or she desires only indirectly, via political 
pressure. Such indirect regulation is not unknown, of course, in other contexts: 
Many statutes involving international trade, human rights, etc. grant discretion 
to the president but require him to first make findings or declarations that may 
prove politically embarrassing if insufficiently founded. Likewise, administra-
tive law, which deals with actions by executive branch offices, makes use of 
procedural requirements and information accessibility as a form of political 
constraint to bound agency discretion. 
Congress’s power to act in this fashion is hard to dispute. As Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote in discussing the necessary and proper power in McCulloch: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are 
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are con-
stitutional. 
. . . . 
. . . [W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of 
the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the de-
gree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial 
department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all preten-
                                                                                                                                
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925) (“[A] pardon can only be granted for a [criminal] con-
tempt fully completed.”); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (stating a pardon may 
be issued at any time after the commission of a criminal offense). Even if a pardon issued in 
advance of a crime were retroactively invalidated by the Court, the recipient of that pardon 
might be able to, in effect, re-validate it via a defense of entrapment, arguing that he commit-
ted a crime only because the nation’s chief law enforcement official, the President, promised 
that it would not be prosecutable. 
15  See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1235–36 (“This issue was, of course, most famously raised 
by President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon. Although President Ford cataloged a long list 
of reasons why the pardon was in the public interest, public suspicion persisted that Presi-
dent Ford had granted the pardon as a quid pro quo for President Nixon's agreement to resign 
or for other political reasons. In order to quell suspicions about the pardon, President Ford 
took the unprecedented step of appearing personally before a congressional committee to 
answer written and oral questions about the Nixon pardon.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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sions to such a power.16 
By legislating to regularize and open up the exercise of the pardon power to at 
least some minimum level of public scrutiny, Congress would not be directly 
interfering with the president’s prerogative, and it strikes me as unlikely that 
federal courts would find otherwise.  
III.     BENEFITS 
Regularized procedure and informational requirements imposed on the 
presidential pardon power would deliver transparency and accountability to a 
process that has been, up to now, significantly lacking in both. Recent events 
seem to suggest that the threat of surreptitious presidential pardons has the po-
tential to get worse, if not in the current administration then in future ones. By 
raising at least the prospect that pardon-related skullduggery might be detected, 
subjected to public and political scrutiny, and perhaps—in extreme cases—
overturned as an unlawful abuse of power (or at least rendered politically ex-
plosive), it would make that sort of behavior less expedient and therefore less 
likely to occur in the first place. And, of course, it would help to establish 
clearer norms regarding which uses of the pardon power are acceptable, and 
which constitute an abuse of the president’s discretion, however vast that dis-
cretion may be. 
CONCLUSION 
To date, the pardon power has been the source of relatively little constitu-
tional friction between Congress and the president. Though there have been a 
few cases in which pardons were granted under circumstances that could fairly 
be described as “shady,”17 those cases involved questions of ordinary misbe-
havior at most, rather than the sort of thing that might produce a more serious 
political and/or constitutional crisis. In this, we have been lucky (so far). 
Luck, however, does not last forever. If it is possible to imagine that a pres-
ident might establish a corps of underlings privileged by advance pardons to 
violate the criminal law in service of his or her political goals (and such a thing 
is not all that difficult to imagine), then it is possible that such a thing might 
happen. Likewise, the prospect of a president pardoning himself (or herself) for 
illegal conduct is hardly beyond imagination. And, even if the ability to self-
pardon is, as some might argue, an essential weapon in a president’s arsenal of 
self-protection and immunity, it would be best for the public that such a pardon 
be granted transparently. 
What is more, all that is needed to put this remedy in place is the passage 
of legislation that is likely to be, at least as a matter of politics, noncontrover-
                                                        
16  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421, 423 (1819). 
17  See, e.g., CROUCH, supra note 2, at 2 (describing pardons by George H.W. Bush of Caspar 
Weinberger and other figures in the Iran-Contra scandal; pardons by William J. Clinton of 
financier and contributor Marc Rich; and commutation by George W. Bush of aide Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby). 
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sial. Such legislation would not tie a president’s hands, and it would certainly 
help establish clearer norms against which future presidential behavior may be 
measured. In the present age, such norms would be most welcome. To the ex-
tent that presidential discretion to award pardons is (or becomes) a question of 
presidential abuse of power, I hope that this paper has demonstrated that there 
is a solution: in the form of legislation that Congress likely has the power to 
enact. We should fervently wish that all of our current political problems might 
be so easily solved. 
